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Abstract
We introduce an extension of the propositional logic of single-conclusion proofs by the second-order variables denoting the
reference constructors of the type “the formula which is proved by x.” The resulting Logic of Proofs with References, FLPref , is
shown to be decidable, and to enjoy soundness and completeness with respect to the intended provability semantics. We show that
FLPref provides a complete test of admissibility of inference rules in a sound extension of arithmetic. This paper may be regarded
as a contribution to the theory of automated reasoning systems.
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1. Introduction
Since Gödel’s incompleteness proof, the formal arithmetic (a recursively enumerable extension of the ﬁrst-order
Peano’s Arithmetic PA) is widely used as a formal proof theory, i.e. a system where the arguments about formal
proofs and provability could be formalized. However, for some applications of formal proof theory outside traditional
foundations of mathematics the formal arithmetic is not efﬁcient.
Consider the following example concerning reliability of the automated reasoning systems. A software of this kind
(see [21]) is a veriﬁcation tool which veriﬁes a proposition  by constructing its formal proof in a formal theory T (the
ground theory supported by the system). A proof development process usually requires a correctness checking and for
this purposes the system is supplied with a proof checking program. Reliability of the system is based, in part, on the
meta assumption that if a proof checker succeeds on given codes of p and , then p is indeed a proof of :
ProofCheck(code(p), code()) = true implies that p is a proof of . (1)
Theoretically, this assumption can be formalized and veriﬁed in arithmetic. However the straightforward formalization,
Gödel’s style, is not feasible, and we have to enhance the expressive power of the ground system (i.e. arithmetic) by
special tools to make this kind of reasoning practical.
An example of such a tool in action is the following derivation of the Second Gödel Incompleteness Theorem from
the arithmetical soundness theorem for the modal Provability Logic GL [23]. GL is known to be sound under every
arithmetical interpretation where corresponds to the formal provability predicate Provable(·) in arithmetic, so ¬⊥
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is translated as the arithmetical consistency statement Consis = ¬Provable(⊥). In this case the key lemma
PA Provable(Consis) → ¬Consis (2)
can be obtained by proof conversion from its modal prototype
GL ¬⊥ → ¬¬⊥.
The latter can be established by a straightforward derivation in GL. Note that a direct formalization of (2) in PA
is problematic.
Here themodal logicGL plays a role of a “proof theoretical interface’’ for the formal arithmetic. In order to construct a
PA-derivation of some sentencewhich involvesProvable(·) one can try restoring itsmodal scheme and then constructing
a GL-derivation of the scheme. The corresponding PA-derivation can be obtained from the GL-derivation of the scheme
by the proof conversion algorithm from the soundness theorem.
Another such interface is given by the modal logic S4. Gödel [12] introduced the modal logic S4 as the logic of
provability. The intended informal meaning of the formula F was “F has a proof.’’ However, a formal provability
semantics for S4 was not proposed. The principal difﬁculty was caused by the veriﬁcation property of proofs which
was incorporated in S4 via the reﬂexivity axiom
F → F.
This axiom is incorrect with respect to the straightforward arithmetical interpretation of F as “F is provable in a
formal theory T’’, where T is any theory for which the Second Gödel Incompleteness Theorem holds, and so S4 is
incompatible with GL. An approach to this problem was sketched by Gödel in his Lecture at Zilsel’s in 1938 (which
remained unpublished till 1995 [13]): to reformulate S4 in the language with atomic propositions “t is a proof of F’’
for a corresponding set of proof expressions representing the structure of the proofs.
This approachwas independently developed byArtëmov. It resulted in a uniﬁed arithmetical provability semantics for
modal logic S4, intuitionistic logic and lambda-terms [2–4]. Artëmov’s Logic of Proofs LP describes the multi-valued
version of the proof predicate “x is a proof of F’’ together with operations on proofs induced by propositional PA-sound
inference rules. In the language of LP the S4-modality (·) is split into an inﬁnite set of term-labeled operators [t](·),
where t is a term combined from proof variables and axiom constants (i.e. the notations for the proofs of axioms) using
a ﬁnite set of function symbols which denote some particular computable operations on proofs. Thus, a term t is some
kind of a program which computes a proof given the proofs denoted by its atomic components. The constructor [·](·) in
LP-language corresponds to the arithmetical proof predicate Prf (·, ·). The veriﬁcation property of proofs is expressed
by LP-axioms of the form
[t]F → F. (3)
LP is sound and complete with respect to arithmetical multi-conclusion proof interpretations and provides an exact
realization of S4 (i.e. S4 F iff there is a way (·)r to label all boxes in F by terms for which LP F r ). So, an S4-proof
of a scheme can be converted into a PA-proof of its arithmetical instant by the composed translation S4 ↪→ LP ↪→ PA.
As was established in [18], the proof search for LP is even easier than one for S4 (LP ∈ p2 , whereas S4 is PSPACE-
complete). All this shows that the proof logic language and LP itself may be considered as the top-level proof-theoretical
interface for arithmetic. Its scope is the same as of the modal one based on S4 and the effectiveness will be the same
or better.
Pure modal interfaces seem to be insufﬁcient to handle the sentences like (1). The choice of the proof predicate which
should reﬂect the particular axioms and inference rules of the system is essential here, whereas the modal language is
insensitive to how theorems of the theory are proved. It turns out that LP which already has its means of specifying
the proof predicate but is an exact realization of S4 is also insufﬁcient. The price for being a realization of S4 is an
additional strict multi-value property which holds for every LP-compatible arithmetical interpretation of the proof logic
language: for any ﬁnite set of provable formulas there should be a single proof which proves all of them. This property
does not hold for the proof predicate
“x is the code of a derivation and y is the code of its last formula’’ (4)
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which is the usual way to internalize provability. Note that the general notion of a proof predicate corresponds to the
class of all decidable (multi-valued) enumerations of the set of all theorems. For a proof predicate of the form (4)
the enumeration is single-valued and reﬂects the particular calculus which is used as the theory formulation and the
particular data structures (lists, trees, etc.) for the derivations. It is highly desirable for an interface to capture efﬁcient
conversion algorithms between an index of a theorem and a derivation of the same theorem. When a proof predicate
has the form (4) these conversions are the straightforward syntactical codings whereas the general case may require
much more complex proof search.
A variant of the proof logic (FLP, the logic of single-conclusion proofs) capable of handling the proof predicates of
the form (4) was developed in [7,16,17]. It exploits essentially the same syntax in order to formalize the single-value
property of proofs: any proof proves a unique formula. In [17] FLP is presented as a ﬂexible proof theoretical interface
for arithmetic. It is shown that aPA-derivation of a sentence about the proof predicate of the form (4) can be obtained by
the proof conversion from the FLP-derivation of its scheme provided the scheme does exist and is provable. Moreover,
the language of FLP can be used as a scheme language for arithmetical inference rules speciﬁcation too (a rule can be
speciﬁed by a formula). The provability of a scheme in FLP (this property is decidable) gives a complete admissibility
test for rules.
All the proof logics mentioned above use propositional languages which considerably restricts the scope of the
method. As it is shown in [8], the ﬁrst-order logics of proofs are not recursively enumerable. So weaker extensions of
the propositional proof logic language should be considered. An example of this sort is given by the combined logic of
proofs and formal provability (LP + GL ) [25] which can be considered as a proof logic interface for arithmetic with
the propositional proof logic language extended by the weak form of existential quantiﬁcation: F = ∃x [x]F .
In this paper, we develop yet another way of extending the propositional proof logic language, namely, by references.
It is based on the single-value property of the proof predicate and results in the formal system FLPref , the Logic of
Proofs with References, which is the extension of FLP. A proof is considered not only as a witness which veriﬁes the
sentence it proves but also as a pointer which speciﬁes this sentence. This gives the reference constructor goal(·), “the
goal of a proof:’’ goal(p) denotes the sentence which is proven by p. More references can be obtained by combining
the goal constructor with pattern matching. For example, “the conclusion of the goal of the proof p’’ denotes G
when p proves (F → G). Syntactically, the reference constructors are treated as second-order variables of the types
Proof → Proposition or Proof → Proof , so the language of FLPref is a weak (quantiﬁer-free) second-order extension
of the propositional proof logic language. It is already capable of expressing the bound quantiﬁcation of the form
∃x¯ [t]F(x¯) G(x¯), ∀x¯ [t]F(x¯) G(x¯)
with some instances of the proof predicate as the guard formulas. The reﬂection operation on proofs which converts a
proof of “t proves F’’ into a proof of F, and the integrity predicate “t is a correct proof’’ are expressible too.
We deﬁne a formal arithmetical semantics for this language and prove that FLPref is sound and compete with respect
to this semantics. It is shown that the arithmetical inference rules speciﬁcation method from [17] can be extended to the
language with references as well. The decidability of FLPref is also established which gives a complete admissibility
test for rules represented by schemes in FLPref -language.
The proofs of the main results and even the formulation of FLPref calculus involve uniﬁcation of expressions with
references. We develop the uniﬁcation technique for FLPref -language and prove that the uniﬁability problem for ﬁnite
sets of conditional equalities in this language is decidable. The conditional equality has the form A = B ⇒ C = D,
where A,B,C,D are well-formed expressions. It also gives a decision algorithm for the predicate “S implies A = B’’,
where S is a ﬁnite set of conditional equalities and A,B are well-formed expressions of the language.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the FLPref -language and its informal semantics are
presented. In Section 3, we discuss necessary arithmetical tools. Section 4 contains a formal deﬁnition of an arithmetical
interpretation for FLPref -language. In Section 5 we develop the uniﬁcation theory for terms with references. This
technique is used for formalization of the single-value property of the proof predicate via the Uniﬁcation axioms in
Section 6, where the calculus FLPref is presented and its arithmetical soundness is established. Sections 7–10 contain
the proofs of the completeness and decidability results for FLPref . Saturation which is the ﬁrst part of the completeness
proof and gives a decision procedure for FLPref is considered in Section 7. We verify this decision method in Sections
8, 9 by constructing a symbolic countermodel for the case when the saturation-based proof search fails. In Section 10,
the symbolic countermodel is converted into the arithmetical one. This proves the arithmetical completeness theorem
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for FLPref . In Section 11, the provability in FLPref is presented as an efﬁcient tool for arithmetical inference rules
veriﬁcation.
2. The language
The language of the Logic of Proofs with References (FLPref ) contains
• Proof letters p1, p2, . . . , function symbols !1 and ×2 (acting on proofs, the result is a proof too).
• Sentence letters S1, S2, . . . , boolean constant ⊥, boolean connective → (we will also use ¬,∧,∨,↔ as shortenings
which denote the corresponding classical representations of these connectives in the basis {⊥,→}).
• An operator symbol [·](·).
• Special names (x.F ) for reference constructors (unary second-order variables) where F is a pattern formula (see
below) and x is any proof or sentence letter which occurs in F. We do not allow the nesting of reference constructors
so F here does not contain reference constructors itself. The particular reference (i.e. an instance of the second-order
variable) will be written as (x.F )t . The only essential thing in the choice of these names is that the pair (x, F ) can
be effectively recovered from the name.
The sets PTm of proof terms, Fm of formulas and Pat ⊂ Fm of pattern formulas are constructed by the rules:
• pi ∈ PTm; Si,⊥ ∈ Fm;
• if t, s ∈ PTm then !t, t × s ∈ PTm;
• if F,G ∈ Fm and t ∈ PTm then (F → G), [t]F ∈ Fm;
• if t ∈ PTm and F ∈ Pat then (pi.F )t ∈ PTm and (Si .F )t ∈ Fm whenever the corresponding proof or sentence
letter occur in F;
• F ∈ Pat iff F is a formula of the form F0 ∧ [pi1 ]F1 ∧ · · · ∧ [pin ]Fn which does not contain reference constructors
or proof letters pi ∈ {pi1 , . . . , pin}.
The informal semantics of the language is as follows. We start with some formal system T. It is supposed to be
sufﬁciently strong so its proof predicate “x is a (code of a) T-proof which proves y’’ is expressible in the language of
T and T can prove some basic facts about proofs and programs dealing with these proofs. In the FLPref -language this
proof predicate is denoted by [·](·)-constructor. Sentence letters denote some sentences of the language of T and proof
letters denote codes of some T-proofs. We admit the most general form of encoding T can deal with. A code means any
program without input for which T can prove its convergence. The codes of proofs compute T-proofs. The operations
! and × are computable operations on these codes. × is induced by the modus ponens rule: it returns a code of a proof
for G given the corresponding codes for F → G and F. The function symbol ! represents the proof checking operation.
Given a code of a proof t which proves some sentence F it recovers the sentence and returns the code of the proof !t
which veriﬁes that t proves F. (Note that in this case the T-proof with the code !t must also verify that t converges.)
We also suppose thatT is a single-conclusion systemwhichmeans that its proof predicate is single-valued (functional).
In this case any proof t points at the unique sentence it proves. The well-formed parts of this sentence can be also
recovered from t via the pattern matching. The FLPref -language provides the corresponding referential notation. The
formula F in (x.F ) is a pattern.
• (Si .F )t denotes the sentence which matches the sentence letter Si in an instance of F when t proves this instance.
• (pi.F )t denotes the proof which matches the proof letter pi in an instance of F when t proves this instance.
Examples.
(1) If [t]((A → B) → C) then (S0.(S0 → S1))t denotes the same as (A → B) and (S1.(S0 → S1))t denotes the
same as C.
(2) Similarly, ref l(t) = (p0.[p0]S0)t denotes s when [t][s]A. Thus, the second-order variable (p0.[p0]S0) represents
the reﬂection operation on proof terms: given a proof t of the sentence “s is a proof of A’’ it returns the proof of A.
(3) The second-order variable (S0.S0) represents the proof goal operation: goal(t) = (S0.S0)t denotes the sentence
which is proved by t when t denotes a proof of some sentence (i.e. when [t]A is valid for some A).
In the case when t does not prove any instance of F the notation (x.F )t is also valid. It denotes an arbitrary sentence
or proof (depending on the type of x). The only restriction is the functionality condition:
when t and s denote the same proof then (x.F )t and (x.F )s must denote the same sentence or the same proof too.
So second-order variables (xi .F ) are similar to Skolem functions for bound existential quantiﬁers in ∀t∃x¯[t]F(x¯)G,
where x¯ is the list of all proof and sentence letters occurring in F ∈ Pat .
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Example. Let F be a pattern formula. Bound quantiﬁers of the forms ∃x¯[t]F(x¯) and ∀x¯[t]F(x¯) are expressible in the
language. Let x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn) be the list of all proof and sentence letters occurring in F = F(x¯) and (x¯.F )t =
((x1.F )t , . . . , (xn.F )t ). Then
∃ x¯[t]F(x¯)G(x¯)= [t]F( (x¯.F )t ) ∧ G((x¯.F )t ),
∀ x¯[t]F(x¯)G(x¯)= [t]F((x¯.F )t ) → G((x¯.F )t ).
Example. The formula is_a_proof (t) = [t]goal(t) (which is equivalent to ∃S0 [t]S0) represents the proposition “t
is a correct proof’’.
Comment. The most general form of referential notation provides a wrong possibility to assign a valid name for an
undeﬁned object which only “looks like’’ a code of a proof. Consider a program  which never terminates and is so
simple that T can proof this fact. Then T can also prove ¬ where  is a sentence “ is a proof of 0 = 0’’. Let t denote
this proof. Then (p0.¬[p0]S0)t will denote the undeﬁned output of . We prove that the restrictions from the deﬁnition
of pattern formulas eliminate this possibility (Lemma 4.5).
Comment. Note that in the FLPref -language a second-order variable (x.F )(·) is always used in the form (x.F )t with
particular t’s. This means that it is emulated by the set of ﬁrst-order variables (x.F )t , t ∈ PTm, with the dependent
evaluation satisfying the functionality condition. Syntactically, the variables of the form (x.F )t are treated in the same
way as the ordinal sentence letters Si or proof letters pi , i.e. (x.F )t has no proper subformulas and no proper subterms.
3. Recursive terms
We start to formalize the semantics declared in the previous section. The ﬁrst notion to be formalized is “a code of
a proof’’. As it was mentioned above a code means some kind of program which computes a T-proof and the ground
formal system T should be able to prove some properties of this program. This requires the programming language to
be embedded into the theory. We use the First-Order Arithmetic PA as T and recursive terms as programs (cf. [15]). For
technical reasons, we consider PA in the extended arithmetical language L(PA containing function symbols for every
primitive recursive function (cf. [22]). It is also supposed that the language L(PA) has two disjoint sets of variable
names for free and bound variables and the syntax includes the rules for the standard choice of the names for bound
variables in a formula (for example: the ﬁrst occurrence of a quantiﬁer must bind z0, the second one must bind z1, etc.).
 denotes the Gödel number of a formula  and n¯ denotes the numeral corresponding to n ∈ .
The set of arithmetical
∑
1-formulas is deﬁned as the least set which contains all boolean combinations of atomic
formulas and is closed under ∧,∨, bound quantiﬁcation and existential quantiﬁcation. An arithmetical formula 
is called provably 1-formula if  and ¬ are provably equivalent to some ∑1-formulas. An arithmetical formula
(x1, . . . , xn, y) is called provably functional w.r.t. y if PA (x1, . . . , xn, y) ∧ (x1, . . . , xn, z) → y = z.
There is a syntactical transformation  −→  which converts∑1-formulas into provably functional∑1-formulas:
(x¯, y) ⇔ ∃ p“〈p, y〉 is the least pair〈q, z〉 ∈ 2 s.t. q is the Gödel’s
number of a derivation of the formula(x¯, z)’’.
In the standard model ofPA any
∑
1-formula(x1, . . . , xn, y) represents some recursively enumerable subsetW() ⊂
n+1. The corresponding set W() is a graph of a partial recursive function with the domain {x¯ ∈ n | ∃z(x¯, z) ∈
W()} and W() ⊂ W(). The expression of the form z.(x1, . . . , xn, z) where  is a ∑1-formula is called a
recursive term and is used as a notation for the partial recursive function with the graph
W() = {(x1, . . . , xn, z) ∈ n+1 | (x1, . . . , xn, z) is valid}.
The recursive term f = z. is closed if the formula ∃z is closed; it is provably total if PA  ∃z. The Gödel’s
number of f is ∃z. A variable is free in f if it is free in ∃z .
In this paper recursive terms are used in arithmetical formulas as suitable shortenings. For any formula
 ∈ L(PA) we deﬁne the result of simultaneous substitution [f0/x0, . . . , fn−1/xn−1] of recursive terms
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f0 = z.0, . . . , fn−1 = z.n−1 in  :
[]f0,...,fn−1x0,...,xn−1 =def ∃z0 . . . ∃zn−1
([]z0,...,zn−1x0,...,xn−1 ∧ [0 ]z0z ∧ · · · ∧ [n−1]zn−1z )
([. . .]u1,...,urv1,...,vr in the right-hand part denotes the ordinary substitution; we suppose that all necessary renamings of bound
variables inside the right-hand part are performed automatically). If  is a ∑1-formula then []f0,...,fn−1x0,...,xn−1 is a ∑1-
formula too. The provable functionality property w.r.t. the variables different from x0, . . . , xn−1 is also preserved. So
the -term
[f ]f0,...,fn−1x0,...,xn−1 =def z.[]f0,...,fn−1x0,...,xn−1
is recursive when f = z. is recursive. This gives the deﬁnition of simultaneous application for recursive terms:
f (f0, . . . , fn−1) =def [f ]f0,...,fn−1x0,...,xn−1 ,
where x0, . . . , xn−1 is the list of all free variables of f. We also use the similar notation (f0, . . . , fn−1) where  is
a formula when the variable names x0, . . . , xn−1 are unessential; it can be easily eliminated using the small scope
convention (cf. [10]).
Lemma 3.1 (Recursive term decomposition). Let , be arithmetical formulas, f, f0, . . . , fn−1, g, g0, . . . , gm−1 be
recursive terms and m, n > 0.
1. If []f0,...,fn−1x0,...,xn−1 = []g0,...,gm−1y0,...,ym−1 then m = n, fi = gi and  = []y0,...,yn−1x0,...,xn−1 .
2. If [f ]f0,...,fn−1x0,...,xn−1  = [g]f0,...,fn−1y0,...,yn−1  and f is z. then m = n, fi = gi and g is z.[]y0,...,yn−1x0,...,xn−1 .
Comment. Note that given a formula of the form (k¯) with number k being substituted as numeral we may fail to
decompose it into the pair , k uniquely. In order to apply Lemma 3.1 we will use another (provably equivalent) form
(k˜) where k is represented by the recursive term k˜ := z.(z = k¯). In particular, the Gödel numbers of formulas will
be substituted in other formulas as the corresponding recursive terms  = ˜. Similarly for recursive terms:
we will substitute f  = ˜f  when we need to pass not only the value but the description of the term too.
Lemma 3.2. Let a recursive term f be closed and provably total.
1. There exists a unique k ∈  (the value of f) for which PA  k¯ = f .
2. If k is the value of f then PA  []k¯x ↔ []fx for any formula .
3. If  is provably 1-formula then []fx is provably 1-formula too.
4. Arithmetical interpretations
Deﬁnition 4.1. A single-valued (functional) proof predicate is a provably 1-formula Prf (x, y) with the properties:
(1) PA  ⇔ for some n ∈ PA Prf (n¯, ) .
(2) The relation {(n,m) ∈ 2|Prf (n¯, m¯) is valid} is single-valued (functional).
(3) The set {n ∈  | ∃y P rf (n¯, y) is valid} is recursive. (For technical reason we suppose that it does not contain
Gödel numbers of formulas.)
Comment. For a single-valued proof predicate Prf the set {(m, n) | Prf (m¯, n¯)} is a graph of the partial recursive
function T (x)  y.P rf (x, y) with a recursive domain. Note that PA Prf (n¯, m¯) iff PA  T (n¯) = m¯ when m, n ∈ 
are ﬁxed.
An example of a single-valued proof predicate is the standard Gödel proof predicate PROOF(x,y) which is the
naturally constructed provably 1-formula for “x is a Gödel number of a PA-derivation and y is the Gödel number of
its last formula’’.
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The operations × and ! can be implemented as suitable recursive terms m(x, y) and c(x). The requirements on the
implementations can be reformulated as follows:
PA  ∃z(m(f, g) = z), PA  ∃z(c(f ) = z),
PA Prf (f,  → ) → (P rf (g, ) → Prf (m(f, g), )),
PA Prf (f, ) → Prf (c(f ), Prf (f, ))
⎫⎬⎭ (5)
for all closed provably total recursive terms f, g and all formulas , ∈ L(PA). For any single-valued proof predicate
such recursive terms do exist but are not unique. The possible examples (see [2,17]) are
mPrf (x, y) =
{
l.P rf (l, ) if T (x) =  →  and T (y) = for some formulas ,,
0 otherwise. (6)
and
cP rf (x) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
l.P rf (l, Prf (f, )) if x = f  for some closed provably total recursive term f and
T (f ) = ,
f if x = f  for some closed provably total recursive term f and
f /∈ Dom(T ),
undeﬁned otherwise.
(7)
Deﬁnition 4.2. A basic single-conclusion (or functional) proof interpretation is a triplet 〈Prf, c,m〉, where Prf is a
single-valued proof predicate and c, m are recursive terms which satisfy (5).
In order to ﬁx a translation of the proof logic language into L(PA) we need to supply the basic interpretation with
some defaults which deﬁne the meaning of variables. For the ﬁrst-order variables (i.e. proof or sentence letters) it is an
arbitrary evaluation (·)∗ of sentence letters by closed arithmetical formulas and proof letters by closed provably total
recursive terms. The formulation of the defaults for second-order variables requires the deﬁnition of matching.
Deﬁnition 4.3. Let the basic interpretation 〈Prf, c,m〉 be ﬁxed. A pattern here is any element of Tm ∪ Fm which
does not contain references. We deﬁne the relation “an arithmetical formula matches the pattern P with the resulting
substitution ’’ as follows (in this deﬁnition we suppose that x = x when x /∈ V ar(P )):
•  matches x with [/x] when x is proof or sentence letter; (0 = 1) matches ⊥ with id;
• ( → )matches (F → G)with  iffmatches F with |V ar(F ) andmatches G with |V ar(G) (here |W denotes
the restricted substitution, i.e. x(|W) is x for x ∈ W and x otherwise);
•  matches [t]F with  iff  = Prf (z., 	), where  matches t with |V ar(t) and 	 matches F with |V ar(F );
•  matches ts with  iff z. is m(z., z.	), where  matches t with |V ar(t) and 	 matches s with |V ar(s);
•  matches !t with  iff z. is c(), where  matches t with |V ar(t).
Lemma 4.4. Let a basic interpretation 〈Prf, c,m〉, an arithmetical formula  and a pattern P be ﬁxed. There is
at most one substitution  such that  matches P with . There exists an algorithm which tests the matching given
Prf, c,m,, P and computes  when  matches P.
The defaults for the second-order variables are total recursive functions (Si .F )∗ (maps natural numbers into closed
arithmetical formulas) and (pi.F )∗ (maps natural numbers into closed provably total recursive terms). We suppose
them to satisfy the condition:
if Prf (n, ) is valid and  matches F with the resulting substitution  then
(Si .F )
∗(n) = Si and (pi.F )∗(n) = z.(pi) (8)
provided that Sj is a closed formula for every sentence letter Sj occurring in F and pj is a 
1-formula which
does not contain free variables different from z for every proof letter pj occurring in F (these requirements on 
will be referred as well-formedness condition).
Lemma 4.5. For every basic interpretation 〈Prf, c,m〉 the defaults (Si .F )∗, (pi.F )∗ do exist.
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Proof. Let F be a pattern formula. Given a natural number n test whether the formula  satisfying the condition
Prf (n, ) does exist, ﬁnd this  and match it against the pattern F. Then check that the resulting substitution is well
formed and return the values (8). If any of these tests fails set (Si .F )∗(n) = (0¯ = 0¯) and (pi.F )∗(n) = 0˜.
By the construction, (Si .F )∗(n) is a closed arithmetical formula and (pi.F )∗(n) is a closed recursive term. It remains
to prove that the recursive term z.(pi) from (8) is provably total when all tests succeed. Suppose all tests succeed.
Let (z) = pi. By the deﬁnitions of pattern formulas and matching,  = 0 ∧Prf (f1, 	1)∧ · · · ∧Prf (fn, 	n)
where z.(z) is fk for some k. The formula  is provable, so PA Prf (z.(z), 	k). But
Prf (z.(z), 	k) = ∃z0∃z1(P rf (z0, z1) ∧ (z0) ∧ (z1 = 	k))
and PA (z) → (z), so PA  ∃z0 (z0) too. 
Deﬁnition 4.6. An interpretation ∗ is a basic interpretation 〈Prf, c,m〉 supplied with the defaults (S∗i , p∗i , (Si .F )∗
and (pi.F )∗) for all variables of the language. We extend the translation (·)∗ to all terms and formulas as follows:
• ⊥∗ = (0 = 1); (F → G)∗ = F ∗ → G∗;
• (ts)∗ = m(t∗, s∗); (!t)∗ = c(t∗); ([t]F)∗ = Prf (t∗, F ∗);
• ((x.F )t )∗ = (x.F )∗(value(t∗)) (here t∗ is a recursive term and value(t∗) denotes its value, the corresponding
natural number, see Lemma 3.2).
Lemma 4.7. Let ∗ = 〈Prf, c,m, (·)∗〉 be an interpretation, F ∈ Fm, t ∈ PTm. Then F ∗ is a closed arithmetical
formula and t∗ is a closed provably total recursive term.
5. Uniﬁcation
Herewe summarize the uniﬁcation techniqueswhich are necessary for the axiomatization of the single-value property
of proof predicate via the uniﬁcation axioms. We extend the approach from [7,1,5,6,17] where the uniﬁcation axioms
were formulated for more primitive languages. The main contribution here is the special treatment of second-order
variables which is sufﬁcient to express the single-valued property but still does not make the uniﬁability problem for
the language undecidable. The general second-order uniﬁcation problem is known to be undecidable [11,14] when
it is formalized in a usual way as the uniﬁcation problem for lambda-terms. We choose another formalization with
second-order variables denoting functions which may have no representation via lambda-terms of the language (the
solution of a ﬁnite uniﬁcation problem remains computable but requires more expressive programming language to
specify its computation). This possibility was sketched in [16,24].
The members of Expr = Tm∪Fm will be considered as terms in the signature  = {⊥,→, [·](·), !,×} and will be
called expressions. The corresponding subterm relation  will be called subexpression relation. It is a well-founded
partial ordering of the set Expr , i.e. the set {e′ ∈ Expr | e′e} is ﬁnite for every e ∈ Expr. Note that with respect to
this ordering all proof letters, sentence letters and references are minimal elements. In particular, an expression of the
form (x.F )t has no proper subexpressions. Let the set Sb(e) be deﬁned inductively:
Sb(e) =
⎧⎨⎩ {e} if e is a proof or sentence letter,{e} ∪ Sb(e1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sb(ek) if e = f (e1, . . . , ek), f ∈ ,{e} ∪ Sb(t) if e = (x.F )t .
It contains all subexpressions of e, all subexpressions of indexes which occur in e, all subexpressions of indexes which
occur in these indexes, etc.
We will also consider (Expr, ) as a directed acyclic graph (DAG, see [20,9] for details) with labeled nodes: a node
e ∈ Expr which is not a variable and not a reference (a function node) is labeled with the main function symbol f ∈ 
of e, other nodes (i.e. minimal elements, we call them variable nodes) are labeled by themselves. We also distinguish
the type of the node (proof term or formula). Every function node e = f (e1, . . . , en) has exactly n outgoing edges:
(e, e1), . . . , (e, en). The variable nodes have no outgoing edges. Thus,  coincides with the accessibility relation of
the DAG.
Comment. In the context of uniﬁcation the proof letters and the sentence letters will be treated as the ﬁrst-order
variables of two sorts (PTm and Fm), i.e. they admit a substitution of expressions of corresponding sorts. A reference
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constructor (x.F )(·) admits a substitution of a function of the type PTm → Expr, so it is the second-order variable.
It is emulated by the set of all its instances (x.F )t , t ∈ PTm. These are also the ﬁrst-order variables, but they admit
a restricted form of substitution called below comprehensive substitution. Essentially, the comprehension constraint
restricts the possible evaluation of references in order to preserve the well-formedness of the mapping t → (x.F )t
after substitution.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A conditional uniﬁcation problem is a ﬁnite set of conditional equalities
Ai = Bi ⇒ Ci = Di, Ai, Bi, Ci,Di ∈ Expr, i = 1, . . . , n. (9)
What should be considered as possible solutions of a uniﬁcation problem? There are two suitable answers for FLPref -
language: valid equivalence relations on the set Expr and comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitutions (see the
deﬁnitions below). We prove them to be equivalent and provide the uniﬁcation algorithm for conditional uniﬁcation
problems (Theorem 5.18).
5.1. Uniﬁcation via equivalence relations
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let M ⊂ Expr. Its Sb-completion is deﬁned as ⋃e∈M Sb(e). It is the least set M ′ ⊃ M with the
property: e ∈ M ′ ⇒ Sb(e) ⊂ M ′. The set M is called Sb-complete when it coincides with its Sb-completion.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Let ∼ be an equivalence relation on a Sb-complete set M ⊂ Expr. It is called M-valid (cf. [20]) when
the following conditions hold for the DAG (M, ):
(i) Two function nodes with the same function symbol are equivalent iff their corresponding sums are equivalent in
pairs.
(ii) Each equivalence class is homogeneous, that is it does not contain two nodes with distinct function symbols or
with different types.
(iii) The graph remains acyclic after identifying equivalent nodes. The corresponding quotient M/∼ remains well-
founded. (The partial ordering of the quotient is deﬁned as the accessibility relation in the reduced graph.)
(iv) Comprehension property: t ∼ s ⇒ (x.F )t ∼ (x.F )s holds for every (x.F )t , (x.F )s ∈ M .
Expr-valid equivalence relations will be called valid.
Deﬁnition 5.4. Let M ⊂ Expr be a Sb-complete set which contains all the expressions Ai, Bi, Ci,Di from (9). An
M-valid equivalence relation ∼ is called consistent with the conditional uniﬁcation problem (9) when
(v) Ai ∼ Bi ⇒ Ci ∼ Di , i = 1, . . . , n.
The conditional uniﬁcation problem (9) is M-uniﬁable iff there exists an M-valid equivalence relation on M which is
consistent with (9). Expr-uniﬁable conditional uniﬁcation problems will be called uniﬁable.
The uniﬁability of (9) is equivalent to its M-uniﬁability for a ﬁnite set M (see Corollary 5.7). Indeed, let M1 ⊂ M2
be two Sb-complete sets containing all the expressions Ai , Bi , Ci , Di from (9). There are two standard transformations
which map M1-valid equivalence relations into M2-valid ones and backward. Both of them preserve the consistency
with (9).
I. (Congruence closure.) Let ∼ be an M1-valid equivalence relation. Deﬁne ∼M2 to be the set of all pairs (A,B) ∈
M2 × M2 such that the equality A = B can be derived from the set of equalities {U = V | U ∼ V } ∪ {U = U | U ∈
Expr} by the rules:
U1 = V1 . . . Un = Vn
f (U1, . . . , Un) = f (V1, . . . , Vn) ,
t = s
vt = vs . (10)
Here f denotes any function symbol from  and n is its arity; v stands for any second-order variable identiﬁer of the
form (x.F ).
Lemma 5.5. (1) The relation ∼M2 is an M2-valid equivalence relation.
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(2) If M1 = M2 then ∼M2 coincides with ∼ (i.e. no “new’’ equalities U = V with U /∼ V can be proved by the
rules (10)).
(3) The relation ∼M2 is consistent with (9) when ∼ is consistent with (9).
II. (Restriction.) Now let ∼ be an M2-valid equivalence relation. Consider its restriction ∼|M1 to M1
∼|M1 = {(U, V ) | U,V ∈ M1, U ∼ V }.
Lemma 5.6. The relation ∼|M1 is an M1-valid equivalence relation. It is consistent with (9) when ∼ is consistent
with (9).
Corollary 5.7. (1) Let M ⊂ Expr be a Sb-complete set which contains all Ai , Bi , Ci , Di from (9). Then (9) is uniﬁable
iff it is M-uniﬁable.
(2) The uniﬁability property of (9) is decidable.
Proof. (1) Follows from Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6. (2) For ﬁnite M the M-uniﬁability property is decidable. Set M to be the
Sb-completion of a ﬁnite set which contains all Ai , Bi , Ci , Di , i = 1, . . . , n and then apply (1). 
5.2. The least valid consistent equivalence relation
Deﬁnition 5.8. Let S be a conditional uniﬁcation problem (9) and A,B ∈ Expr. We will write A = B mod S when
A ∼ B for every valid equivalence relation which is consistent with S.
Lemma 5.9. (1) If the conditional uniﬁcation problem S of the form (9) is uniﬁable then there exists the least valid
consistent (with S) equivalence relation ∼. In this case (A = B mod S) ⇔ A ∼ B. Otherwise A = B mod S holds for
every A,B ∈ Expr.
(2) Let ∼ be the least valid consistent with (9) equivalence relation and M ⊂ Expr be a Sb-complete set which
contains all expressions Ai, Bi, Ci,Di from (9). Then ∼|M is the least M-valid consistent with (9) equivalence relation
and (∼|M )Expr coincides with ∼.
(3) The relation (A = B mod S) is decidable.
Proof. (1) The intersection of all valid consistent equivalence relations is also consistent with S.
(2) In this case (9) is M-uniﬁable by Corollary 5.7 and the intersection of all M-valid consistent equivalence relations
gives the least onewhich is also consistent with (9). Let∼0 denote this intersection. ByLemma 5.5 (∼0)Expr is valid and
consistent with (9) and ((∼0)Expr)|M coincides with ∼0. Thus, ∼ is a subset of (∼0)Expr and ∼|M is a subset of ∼0. But
∼0 is a subset of ∼|M by Lemma 5.6, so ∼|M coincides with ∼0. Moreover, ∼=∼Expr⊃ (∼|M )Expr = (∼0)Expr ⊃∼,
so (∼|M )Expr coincides with ∼.
(3) The decision procedure is as follows. Check the uniﬁability of S; if it is not uniﬁable return “yes’’. Otherwise
the least valid consistent equivalence relation ∼ for S has the form (∼|M )Expr , where ∼|M is an M-valid consistent
equivalence relation on a ﬁnite Sb-complete set M . We may chose M to be the least Sb-complete set which contains
all expressions from S. Both M and ∼|M can be found effectively from S. Try to prove the equality A = B by the
calculus (10) (the proof size should not exceed the total length of the equality); return “yes’’ when succeed and “no’’
when fail. 
Comment. A uniﬁable conditional uniﬁcation problem S of the form (9) may be considered up to its least valid
consistent equivalence relation ∼. Indeed, let S′ be obtained from S by the replacement of its conditional equality
Ai = Bi ⇒ Ci = Di with A′i = B ′i ⇒ C′i = D′i where A′i ∼ Ai , B ′i ∼ Bi , C′i ∼ Ci , D′i ∼ Di . Then S′ has the
same valid consistent equivalence relations as S. (Both of them have the same valid consistent equivalence relations
as S ∪ S′.)
Deﬁnition 5.10. A valid equivalence relation ∼ is ﬁnitely generated if it coincides with (∼|M )Expr for some ﬁnite
Sb-complete set M. (In this case ∼ coincides with (∼|M′ )Expr for every Sb-complete set M ′ ⊃ M .)
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It is proved in Lemma 5.9 that the least valid consistent with (9) equivalence relation is ﬁnitely generated. Now we
will show that the corresponding equivalence classes are ﬁnite and the Sb-completion operation naturally extended to
sets of equivalence classes preserves ﬁniteness.
Deﬁnition 5.11. For a valid equivalence relation ∼ let denote the transitive closure of the relation0 where e10 e2
iff e1e2 or e1 ∼ e2 or ve1 = e2 for some s.o. variable identiﬁer v. Let e = {e′ ∈ Expr | e′ e}.
Lemma 5.12. Let a valid equivalence relation ∼ be ﬁnitely generated and M be a ﬁnite set for which (∼|M )Expr
coincides with ∼. Then the equivalence class [e]∼ and the set e are ﬁnite for every e ∈ Expr. Moreover, the lists of
all elements of these sets can be computed effectively from e ∈ Expr.
Proof. Let e ∈ Expr be given. The equivalence class [e]∼ is the set of all expressions e′ for which the equality e = e′ is
derivable in the calculus (10). Consider a derivation of an equality e = e′ . The total number of applied rules is bounded
by the length of e . Any axiom involved has the form U = V where U,V ∈ M or U = U where U is a subexpression
of e. The set of all such derivations is ﬁnite and can be computed effectively from e and ∼|M . This proves the ﬁniteness
of [e]∼ and gives the method to list all its members.
Let us prove the ﬁniteness of e. The set Sb(e) is ﬁnite and Sb(e) ⊂ e for every e ∈ Expr. We claim that e is the




which proves the ﬁniteness of e and gives the method to compute all its members. It is sufﬁcient to prove that for every
e′ e there exists e′′ ∼ e such that e′ ∈ Sb(e′′). Induction on the length of a sequence e′ = e00 · · · 0 en−10 en =
e. Case n = 0 is trivial. Suppose n > 0, d ∼ en−1 and e′ ∈ Sb(d). If en−1en then the corresponding e′′ can be
obtained from e by the replacement of some occurrence of en−1 with d. When en−1 ∼ en take e′′ = d . When en = ven−1
take e′′ = vd . 
5.3. Uniﬁcation via inﬁnite substitutions
Deﬁnition 5.13. An inﬁnite substitution is a total function  : Expr → Expr which maps terms into terms and
formulas into formulas and satisﬁes the following condition: (f (e1, . . . , en)) = f (e1, . . . , en) for every e1. . . . en ∈
Expr, f ∈ , arity(f ) = n. An inﬁnite substitution is called comprehensive when
t = s ⇒ vt = vs (12)
holds for every second-order variable identiﬁer v. An inﬁnite substitution  is called idempotent when 2 = .
Deﬁnition 5.14. A comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution  is called a uniﬁer of the conditional uniﬁcation
problem (9) when for i = 1, . . . , n at least one of the conditions Ai = Bi or Ci = Di is valid.
Comment. An inﬁnite substitution treats the instances vt of a second-order variable v and the ﬁrst-order variables pi
and Si quite similarly. It is completely deﬁned by its values on the set
Dom() = {z | z = z and z has one of the forms pi, Si or (x.F )t }.
For a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution  holds
vt = vt, (13)
where v is a second-order variable identiﬁer. It follows from (12) when s = t.
Consider the equivalence relation ∼ induced by an inﬁnite substitution : e1 ∼ e2 iff e1 = e2.
Lemma 5.15. (1) For a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution  the equivalence relation ∼ is valid. It is
consistent with the conditional uniﬁcation problem (9) iff  is a uniﬁer of (9).
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(2) If  and  are inﬁnite substitutions,  is idempotent and ∼ is a subset of ∼ then there exists an inﬁnite
substitution  with the properties:  = , Dom() ∩ Dom() = ∅.
Proof. (1) Straightforward. (2) When z has one of the forms pi, Si or (x.F )t deﬁne z = z if z = z and z = z
otherwise. Extend this mapping to an inﬁnite substitution. Then Dom()∩Dom() = ∅. Moreover,  =  because
 is idempotent. By the same reason e ∼ e for every e ∈ Expr. So e ∼ e too which proves that  = . 
Lemma 5.16. Let ∼ be a valid equivalence relation. There exists a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution 
such that ∼ is ∼ (the choice is not unique). The substitution  can be chosen uniformly to be a computable function
when ∼ is ﬁnitely generated: the values of e can be found by an algorithm given e ∈ Expr and ∼|M when ∼ has the
form (∼|M )Expr for a ﬁnite set M. Moreover, in this case it is possible to satisfy the following additional condition (we
call it the elimination property):
Sb(e) ∩ Dom() = ∅, e ∈ Expr. (14)
Proof. Let g be a choice function with the domain Expr/∼ , i.e. g([e]∼) ∈ [e]∼ holds. Deﬁne e = g([e]∼) when
the equivalence class [e]∼ does not contain complex expressions of the form f (e1, . . . , en), f ∈ . Otherwise, set
e = f (e1, . . . , en) where f (e1, . . . , en) is some member of [e]∼. This deﬁnition is correct because the equivalence
relation ∼ is valid. It gives a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution  for which ∼ coincides with ∼. Finitely
generated equivalence relations have uniformly computable choice functions by Lemma 5.12, so the corresponding
inﬁnite substitutions will be uniformly computable too.
Suppose that ∼ is ﬁnitely generated. In order to satisfy the elimination property the choice function g and the inﬁnite
substitution  should be deﬁned simultaneously by recursion. The deﬁnition of  involves only those values of g([e]∼)
for which the equivalence class [e]∼ does not contain complex expressions. It may contain ﬁrst-order variables and
second-order variable instances only. We add to the deﬁnition of  the following clause:
when [e]∼ does not contain complex expressions but contains ﬁrst-order variables, set g([e]∼) to be one of them;
when [e]∼ contains second-order variable instances only, take one of them, say vt , and deﬁne g([e]∼) to be vt.
(In both cases take the ﬁrst element in the list of [e]∼ which satisﬁes the condition.)
We have to prove that the deﬁnition really gives a choice function for equivalence classes which does not contain
complex expressions, i.e. g([e]∼) ∈ [e]∼ for these equivalence classes. It follows from the fact that t is deﬁned and
t ∼ t holds for every t ∈ Expr (see Deﬁnition 5.3(iv)). Let us prove this.
Suppose t1 is undeﬁned for some t1 ∈ Expr. There exists an expression t ′1(vt2) ∼ t1 for which the value t2 is
undeﬁned too (the notation t ′1(vt2) indicates some occurrence of a second-order variable instance vt2 in t ′1). The iteration
of this construction gives t ′2(vt3) ∼ t2, t ′3(vt4) ∼ t3, · · · . As a consequence we will have
t1 ∼ t ′1(vt2) ∼ t ′1(vt ′2(vt3 )) ∼ t
′
1(vt ′2(vt ′3(vt4 )
)) ∼ . . . .
This sequence contains inﬁnitely many distinct expressions which contradicts with the ﬁniteness of [t1]∼ (Lemma
5.12). Now the statement t ∼ t can be proved by straightforward induction on the length of the computation of t.
So g is a choice function,  is a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution and ∼ coincides with ∼.
Let us prove (14) by induction on the index depth of the expression e where the index depth d(e) of an expression
e is deﬁned as follows:
• d(e) = 0 when e is a ﬁrst-order variable;
• d(f (e1, . . . , en)) = maxi d(ei) for f ∈ ;
• d(vt ) = d(t) + 1.
Let x1, . . . , xm, v1t1 , . . . , v
n
tn
be the list of all subexpressions of ewhich are the ﬁrst-order variables or the second-order
variable instances. None of them belongs to Dom() because  is idempotent, so Sb(e) ∩ Dom() = ⋃i Sb(ti) ∩
Dom(). This proves (14) when d(e) = 0. Suppose d(e) > 0. By (13) we have viti = viti = viti. But viti =
g(viti) = vs for some vs ∼ viti by the deﬁnition of . So vs coincides with viti and ti has the form s but
d(ti) < d(e). By inductive hypothesis Sb(ti) ∩ Dom() = ∅. 
Deﬁnition 5.17. A uniﬁer  of the conditional uniﬁcation problem (9) is called a weak most general uniﬁer (wmgu)
for (9) when every uniﬁer  of (9) can be represented in the form  = , where  is an inﬁnite substitution. (Without
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loss of generality, one may assume that Dom()∩Dom() = ∅ in this representation. Note that it is not required that
every substitution of the form  is a uniﬁer of (9).)
The following theorem integrates the results of this section.
Theorem 5.18. For the conditional uniﬁcation problem (9) the following statements are equivalent:
1. It is uniﬁable (in the sense of Deﬁnition 5.1).
2. There exists the least valid consistent equivalence relation.
3. It has a uniﬁer.
4. It has a wmgu  with the elimination property (14).
The uniﬁability property of (9) is decidable. The least equivalence relation from (2) is decidable and can be chosen
effectively uniformly on (9). The wmgu from (4) can be chosen to be computable uniformly on (9).
6. Formal system
Deﬁnition 6.1. With a formula [t1]F1 ∧ · · · ∧ [tn]Fn we associate a conditional uniﬁcation problem S:
ti = tj ⇒ Fi = Fj , i, j = 1, . . . , n. (15)
The uniﬁcation axiom is a formula of the form
[t1]F1 ∧ · · · ∧ [tn]Fn → (A ↔ B), (16)
where A = B mod S. Note that the set of all uniﬁcation axioms is decidable by Lemma 5.9. The calculus FLPref is
deﬁned as follows:
Axioms.
(A0) Axioms of the classical propositional logic.
(A1) [t]F → F .
(A2) [t](F → G) → ([s]F → [ts]G).
(A3) [t]F → [!t][t]F .
(A4) All uniﬁcation axioms.
(A5) [t]F(e¯) → [t]F( (x¯.F )t ),
where F = F(x¯) is a pattern formula,
x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn) is a list of all proof and sentence from F,
e¯ = (e1, . . . , en) is the list of expressions s.t. F(e¯) ∈ Fm,
(x¯.F )t = ( (x1.F )t , . . . , (xn.F )t ).
Rule. modus ponens.
Theorem 6.2 (Arithmetical soundness). For every arithmetical interpretation∗ = 〈Prf, c,m, (·)∗〉holds: if FLPref F
then PA F ∗.
Proof. It is sufﬁcient to show that the translations of axioms (A1)–(A5) arePA-provable. Case (A1). ([t]F)∗ is provably
1-formula, so either PA  ([t]F)∗ or PA ¬([t]F)∗. In the ﬁrst subcase Prf (t∗, F ∗) is valid and PA F ∗. Thus, in
both subcases PA  ([t]F)∗ → F ∗.
Cases (A2), (A3), (A5). The translations of these axioms are valid provably 1-formulas. So they are provable
in PA.
Case (A4). Consider a uniﬁcation axiom (16). Let G be its premise. The formula G∗ = ([t1]F1 ∧ · · · ∧ [tn]Fn)∗ =
Prf (t∗1 , F ∗1 )∧· · ·∧Prf (t∗n , F ∗n ) is provably1, soPA ¬G∗ whenG∗ is not valid and in this casePA  (G → C)∗
for any C ∈ Fm.
Let G∗ be valid. Deﬁne the equivalence relation on Expr as follows: U ∼ V iff U and V are both formulas or both
proof terms and U∗ = V ∗. The relation ∼ is valid. Indeed, the conditions (i), (ii) from Deﬁnition 5.3 follow from
156 Vladimir N. Krupski / Theoretical Computer Science 357 (2006) 143–166
Lemma 3.1. The condition (iii) holds because U∗ < V ∗ when U is a proper subexpression of V so the reduced
graph does not contain cycles. The comprehension property (iv) holds because (x.F )∗ is a function.
The relation ∼ is consistent with the conditional uniﬁcation problem S deﬁned as (15). Indeed, by Lemmas 3.2,
4.7 there exist ki ∈  such that PA  t∗i = k¯i and PA Prf (t∗i , F ∗i ) ↔ Prf (k¯i , F ∗i ). So Prf (k¯1, F ∗1 ) ∧ · · · ∧
Prf (k¯n, F ∗n ) is valid. If ti ∼ tj then ki = kj = k and the formula Prf (k¯, F ∗i ) ∧ Prf (k¯, F ∗j ) is valid. By the
single-value property of the proof predicate we have F ∗i  = F ∗j  and Fi ∼ Fj .
The conditional uniﬁcation problem S is uniﬁable and A = B mod S implies A ∼ B. So A∗ coincides with B∗ and
PA  (G∗ → (A∗ ↔ B∗)). 
7. Saturation procedure
The logic FLPref is decidable. The decision algorithm is based on the nondeterministic saturation procedure de-
scribed below. All the computations of the saturation procedure form a tree with binary branching. It will be proved
that every computation of the saturation procedure terminates and FLPref F iff every computation terminates with
failure.
The saturation procedure uses the global data structure (S,,), where S is a conditional uniﬁcation problem of
the form (15) with the least valid consistent equivalence relation ∼ and ,  are ﬁnite sets containing equivalence
classes of the form [G]∼ with G ∈ Fm. It also involves the DAG D = (V,E) which represents all expressions
e
⋃
( ∪ ) up to the equivalence relation ∼. The nodes (V) are equivalence classes of these expressions. A node
[f (e1, . . . , ek)]∼ is labeled by the unique function symbol f ∈  (classes are homogeneous) and has the outgoing
edges which lead to [ei]∼, i = 1, . . . , k. Any term node [t]∼ is equipped with the backward pointers to the nodes of the
form [vt ]∼ ∈ V ; one pointer for each v. The identiﬁer v is stored too, so a pointer has the form of a pair (v, [vt ]∼). If
[vt ]∼ = [wt ]∼ = n ∈ V then [t]∼ is labeled by both pairs (v,n) and (w,n). The nodes from∪ are labeled by or by
, respectively. The DAG D is well deﬁned for any triple (S,,) and can be computed from it (see Deﬁnition 5.3 and
Lemma 5.12).
The saturation procedure starts from a formula F0 ∈ Fm. It initializes the data structure: S := ∅;  := ∅;  :=
{{⊥}, {F0}}. Then it applies repeatedly the following block of instructions:
(1) For every X → Y ∈ ⋃ which has not been discharged by the rule 1 before nondeterministically add [Y ]∼ to
 or add [X]∼ to  and discharge the class [X → Y ]∼ and all its descendants (the classes which will contain
members of [X → Y ]∼ later; to discharge a class means to discharge all its elements). If ∩ = ∅ then terminate
with failure else go to 2.
(2) For every X → Y ∈ ⋃ add [X]∼ to  and add [Y ]∼ to  . If ∩ = ∅ then terminate with failure else go to 3.
(3) For every [t]X ∈ ⋃ do: (1) add [X]∼ to ; (2) if X has the form H(e¯) where H(x¯) is a pattern formula
and a second-order variable identiﬁer of the form (z.H) already occurs in some expression from
⋃
V then add
[[t]H((x¯.H)t )]∼ to  (this should be done for every decomposition X = H(e¯)). Repeat this action until  will
not change. If  ∩  = ∅ then terminate with failure else go to 4.
(4) For every pair [s]X, [t](X → Y ) ∈ ⋃ do: if [ts]∼ ∈ V then add [[ts]Y ]∼ to . If  ∩  = ∅ then terminate
with failure else go to 5.
(5) For every formula [t]X ∈ ⋃ do: if [!t]∼ ∈ V then add [[!t][t]X]∼ to . If ∩ = ∅ then terminate with failure
else go to 6.
(6) Combine a formula G = [t1]F1 ∧ · · · ∧ [tn]Fn where [ti]Fi , i = 1, . . . , n are all the formulas of the form
[t]X ∈ ⋃ and updates S to be the conditional uniﬁcation problem (15) associated with G. Then test the
uniﬁability of S and terminate with failure when S is not uniﬁable. Otherwise, compute the new equivalence
relation ∼ and update ,:
 :=
{











If  ∩  = ∅ then terminate with failure else go to 7.
(7) Compare the DAG D with one obtained at the step 7 of the previous iteration. If D has not changed (is isomorphic
to the previous one and the contents of every equivalence class [e]∼ ∈ V has not changed too) then stop with
success. Else go to 1.
It follows from Corollary 5.7 and Lemmas 5.9 and 5.12 that every step terminates.
Vladimir N. Krupski / Theoretical Computer Science 357 (2006) 143–166 157
Theorem 7.1. Every computation of the saturation procedure terminates. The set of all computations with a ﬁxed
initial formula F0 ∈ Fm is ﬁnite.
Proof. All the computations starting from the initial formula F0 form a computation tree. Its branching is at most
binary. It is ﬁnite provided it does not contain an inﬁnite computation. So it is sufﬁcient to prove that every computation
terminates.
Consider a computation which does not terminate with failure. Let 〈D1 = (V1,E1),∼1〉 and 〈D2 = (V2,E2),∼2〉
be the states corresponding to a pair of consecutive steps 7. Consider the computation steps which transform the former
state into the latter one.
Steps 1–5 extend the sets , and V. This will extend S and ∼. Step 6 will merge some equivalence classes (nodes
of the DAG) and possibly add some new expressions to them. So [e]∼1 ⊂ [e]∼2 ∈ V2 holds for every e ∈
⋃
V1. 
Lemma 7.2. Let [e]∼2 ∈ V2 be a term node, i.e. e ∈ PTm. Then [e′]∼1 ⊂ [e]∼2 for some e′ ∈
⋃
V1.
Proof. Suppose the opposite: some [e]∼2 ∈ V2 does not contain any element of
⋃
V1. Consider one that appears in⋃
V2 ﬁrst. Steps 1, 2, 4 and 5 don’t add new term nodes to V at all. Step 3 may add a term node of the form [(xi .H)t ]∼1
when xi is a proof letter. But then a conditional equality
t = t ⇒ H(. . . , ei, . . .) = H(. . . , (xi .H)t , . . .)
will appear in S and Step 6 will merge the classes [(xi .H)t ]∼1 and [ei]∼1 . The latter appears in V earlier, so ei ∼2 e′
for some e′ ∈ ⋃V1. Thus
[e′]∼1 ⊂ [e′]∼2 ⊂ [(xi .H)t ]∼2 .
So this e appears in
⋃
V2 at Step 6. Then e2 t1 for some t1 ∈ ⋃V1 where2 is the relation associated with ∼2 (see
Deﬁnition 5.11). By (11) there exists t2 ∈ ⋃V2 such that e ∈ Sb(t2) and t1 ∼2 t2. Consider the following predicate:







We have Q(t1) and ¬Q(t2). Let M be⋃V where V is taken when Step 5 terminates. We have proved that Q(t) holds
for every t ∈ M . But M is Sb-complete and contains all the formulas [ti]Fi which are involved in the construction of
new S at Step 6, so, by Lemma 5.9, the relation ∼2 coincides with ((∼2)|M)Expr . This means that the equality t1 = t2
is derivable by the rules (10) from the axioms of the form U = V with Q(U) ↔ Q(V ). But the rules (10) preserve
this property. Contradiction. 
Lemma 7.3. The following statement holds for an iteration with sufﬁciently large number: for every formula node
[e]∼2 ∈ V2 (i.e. e ∈ Fm) there exists a node [e′]∼1 ∈ V1 s.t. [e′]∼1 ⊂ [e]∼2 .
Proof. The proof is quite similar to the proof of Lemma 7.2. The only difference is the treatment of Steps 4 and 5. Unlike
the term case now they can add new nodes to the DAG, but at most one per every term node of the form [ts]∼ and [!t]∼,
respectively. For convenience consider Step 4. If it adds a new node [[ts]Y ]∼ and a node of the form [[ts]Z]∼ already
exists in the DAG then the conditional equality ts = ts ⇒ Y = Z appears in S and Step 6 will merge these nodes. The
same with Step 5. So, by Lemma 7.2, Steps 4 and 5 can add at most m nodes were m is the number of term nodes in
the initial DAG. Consider any iteration after the moment when all these nodes are added. The argument from Lemma
7.2 will sufﬁce when the deﬁnition of the predicate Q is modiﬁed as follows: Q(t) ⇔ (∀e ∈ Sb(t)) (∃e′ ∈ ⋃V1)
(e ∼2 e′). 
Let us prove the theorem. Consider the set V after n iterations when n is sufﬁciently large. It is ﬁnite and the
computation never adds new elements to it (Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3). So for some n0 all iterations with numbers n > n0
will not change this set at all. These iterations will not change the existing labels but may add some new ones. The set
of labels which may appear in a node is bounded, so at some iteration with number n1 > n0 the last label will be set.
The next iteration will be ﬁnal, i.e. no new expressions will be added to an equivalence class [e]∼ ∈ V. Indeed, the
conditional uniﬁcation problems S1 and S2 (before and after this iteration) have the same valid consistent equivalence
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relations (see Comment after Lemma 5.9), so ∼1 coincides with ∼2 and [e]∼1 = [e]∼2 . Thus, a computation which
does not terminate with failure terminates with success. 
Lemma 7.4. If every computation of the saturation procedure starting from F0 ∈ Fm terminates with failure then
FLPref F0 .
Proof. Consider the computation tree (its nodes represent all states of all computations starting from F0). It has the












(empty conjunction denotes ). It is sufﬁcient because in the root node this formula is equivalent to F0. The induction
steps corresponding to Steps 1–5 are fairly standard. Consider a node obtained as a result of Step 6. If it is a leaf node






H → G, (19)
so (18) holds. Otherwise  and  are updated by (17). Let ∼′ denote the equivalence relation correspondent to the
parent node. It follows from the uniﬁcation axioms thatFLPref G → (∧H∼e H ↔ ∧H∼′e H) because [e]∼′ ⊂ [e]∼.
Moreover, (19) holds for the updated too because the assignments (17) extend⋃. So, FLPref  ∧[e]∈∧H∼e H →
(I ′ ↔ I ), where I is the formula from (18) and I ′ is its variant correspondent to the parent node. By inductive hypothesis,




H∼e H → I , which is equivalent to (18). 
8. Successive saturation
In Sections 8–10, we consider a single computation of the saturation procedure which starts from a formula F0 and
terminates with success. The resulting data structure is (,, S), the DAG is D = (V, E) and the equivalence relation
is ∼. Our goal is to construct an arithmetical interpretation ∗ for which F ∗0 is not valid. This will prove the arithmetical
completeness and the decidability of FLPref .
It is supposed that the Gödel numbering of Expr is deﬁned in the usual way (see [19]; references of the form (x.F )t
are treated as terms ref (x, F, t), where ref is a special new function symbol). The Gödel number of an expression
e ∈ Expr never coincides with the Gödel number of a term or a formula or a sequence of formulas from arithmetical
language and PA can prove this fact. A code (a Gödel number) of a ﬁnite set {e1, . . . , ek} ⊂ Expr is∑ki=1 2ni , where
ni is the Gödel number of ei (the code of ∅ is 0).
Lemma 8.1. (1) The predicate “x and y are Gödel numbers of some expressions e1, e2 ∈ Expr and e1 ∼ e2 holds’’
can be represented by an arithmetical provably 1-formula. The statement “∼ is a valid equivalence relation which is
consistent with S’’ can be formalized and proved in PA.
(2) The code of [e]∼ can be computed from the Gödel number of e ∈ Expr by a primitive recursive function g. For
some ﬁxed primitive recursive function g this property is provable in PA.
(3) One can construct a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution  with the elimination property such that
∼ coincides with ∼ (i.e.  is a wmgu for S) and the mapping e −→ e can be computed by a provably total
recursive function. The facts “ is a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution with the elimination property’’ and
“ ∼ coincides with ∼’’ are provable in PA.
(4) It is provable in PA that for every expression e /∈ ⋃V one of the following statements holds:
• [e]∼ = {vt1 , . . . , vtn} where t1 = . . . = tn and vti = vti;• [e]∼ = {x} where x is a proof or sentence letter and x = x;
• [e]∼ = {f (e11, . . . , e1m), . . . , f (el1, . . . , elm)} where f ∈ , e1i  = · · · = eli, i = 1, . . . , m and f (ej1 , . . . , ejm)
= f (ej1, . . . , ejm).
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Proof. (1) The relation ∼ coincides with (∼|M)Expr where M = ⋃V is ﬁnite. So e1 ∼ e2 iff the equality e1 = e2 is
provable in the calculus (10). All the expressions in the derivation belong to Sb(e1) ∪ Sb(e2). PA can prove that the
size of this derivation is bound by min{e1, e2} so the arithmetical formula E(x, y) = “the equality e1 = e2 where
e1 = x, e2 = y has a derivation in the calculus (10) of the size < min{x, y}’’ represents ∼ and is provably 1.
Let us argue in PA. By induction on the height of a derivations in (10) it can be proved that E(x, y) represents an
equivalence relation. By induction on e one can prove that “any expression e /∈ M has one of the forms e = x (where
x is a proof or sentence letter) or e = f (e1, . . . en), f ∈  or e = vt and its equivalence class is
[x]∼ = {x},
[f (e1, . . . en)]∼ = {f (e′1, . . . e′n) | e′i ∼ ei, i = 1, . . . , n},
[vt ]∼ = {vt ′ | t ′ ∼ t}, (20)
respectively’’.
This will prove (i),(ii),(iv) from the deﬁnition of a valid equivalence relation (Deﬁnition 5.3) (case e ∈ M is ﬁnite
and can be considered separately). The next step is to prove by induction on e that gn(e) = sup{e′ | e′ ∼ e} is
ﬁnite for every e ∈ Expr and is strictly increasing with respect to the subexpression relation: e′ < e ⇒ gn(e′) < gn(e).
As a consequence, we will have that “the length of every sequence of the form e0 ∼ e1 > e2 ∼ e3 > · · · is bound by
gn(e0) and e0 = ei for i > 1’’ which is the formalization of (iii) from Deﬁnition 5.3.
The consistency with S is formalized as a conjunction of a ﬁnite set of valid formulas of the form E(ti, tj) →
E(Fi, Fj). It is a provably 1-formula, so it is provable in PA.
(2) The straightforward formalization of the proof of Lemma 5.12.
(3) The required inﬁnite substitution  was constructed in Lemma 5.16. Let [e]∼ = {x1, . . . , xk, v1t1 , . . . , vltl ,
f (e1), . . . , f (em)} where xi are the ﬁrst-order variables, viti are references, f ∈  and ei = (ei1, . . . , eiarity(f )),
eij ∈ Expr. Then
e =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
f (e11, . . . , e
1
arity(f )) if m > 0,
x1 if m = 0, k > 0,
v1t1 if m = k = 0
(k + l +m > 0; the conditions m = 0 and k = 0 mean that the corresponding part of [e]∼ is empty). Let h be the total
recursive extension of the mapping e → e with h(n) = 0 when n = e for every e ∈ Expr. The totality of h
can be proved in PA by induction on the value of gn(e). By the same induction one can prove in PA that
• the value of h(e) is d for some d ∈ Expr, this d belongs to [e]∼ and is the same for all e′ ∼ e (which implies
“∼ coincides with ∼’’, the comprehension property and the idempotency of );
• if e = f (e1, . . . , en) thend = f (e′1, . . . , e′n)whereh(ei) = e′i, i = 1, . . . , n (i.e. “ is an inﬁnite substitution’’);• the elimination property of .
(4) The following proof can be easily formalized in PA. Suppose e /∈ ⋃V. The statement is trivial when [e]∼ is a
singleton. Let e ∼ e′ for some e′ = e. We have seen that ∼ coincides with (∼|M)Expr where M = ⋃V. The equality
e = e′ is derivable in the calculus (10) and is not an axiom. Consider the last rule in the derivation. There are two
possibilities.
The last rule derives vt = vs from t = s and the equality t = s is derivable too. This means that t = s. The
equivalence class [vt ]∼ contains all the expressions vt ′ with t = t ′ (the comprehension property) and nothing more.
The value of vt is one of them.
The last rule derives f (e1, . . . , em) = f (e′1, . . . , e′m) from ei = e′i and ei = e′i. The equivalence class[f (e1, . . . , em)]∼ contains all the expressions f (e1′′, . . . , em′′) with ei = ei ′′ and nothing more. The value of
f (e1, . . . , em) is one of them. 
Let ′ be the least extension of  which satisﬁes the conditions:
[[t](X → Y )]∼ ∈ ′, [[s]X]∼ ∈ ′ ⇒ [[ts]Y ]∼ ∈ ′, [[t]X]∼ ∈ ′ ⇒ [[!t][t]X]∼ ∈ ′. (21)
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Lemma 8.2. (1) Let [F ]∼ ∈ ′\ and G ∼ F . If F has the form [ts]Y then G = [t1s1]Y1 for some t1 ∼ t , s1 ∼ s,
Y1 ∼ Y . If F has the form [!t][t]X then G = [!t1][s1]X1 for some t1 ∼ s1 ∼ t , X1 ∼ X or G = [!t1]Z where t1 ∼ t
and Z ∈ [[t]X]∼ ∈ .
(2) ′ ∩ = ∅. For a given t at most one equivalence class of the form [[t]X]∼ belongs to ′. This fact can be proved
in PA.
(3) The predicates “x is F for some F ∈ ⋃′’’ and “x is t for some [t]X ∈ ⋃′’’ can be represented in PA
by provably 1-formulas. The mapping
t → (the code of [[t]X]∼ s.t.[[t]X]∼ ∈ ′) (22)
can be computed by a provably total recursive function (it returns 0 when such an equivalence class does not exist);
the corresponding property of this function is provable in PA.
Proof. (1) Follows from (20). (2)  ∩  = ∅ because the computation of the saturation procedure terminates with
success. Suppose ′ ∩ = ∅. Then ′ ∩ contains an equivalence class of the form [[t]X]∼ where t = t1s1 or t =!t1
and t ∈ ⋃V. This is impossible because Steps 4, 5 of the saturation procedure did not add this class to .
Consider (21) as inference rules. The equivalence class [F ]∼ belongs to ′ iff F ∈ ⋃ or F ∼ [t]X and the
sentence [[t]X]∼ ∈ ′ is derivable by the rules (21) from a ﬁnite set of axioms which describe the contents of . By
induction on the length n of the derivation of [[t]X]∼ ∈ ′ it can be proved that the sentence of the form [[t]Y ]∼ ∈ ′
with Y /∼ X has no derivation of the length mn. (The basis is forced by Step 6 of the saturation procedure and the
inductive steps follow from the ﬁrst part of the lemma.) So at least one of the sentences [[t]X]∼ ∈ ′ or [[t]Y ]∼ ∈ ′
has no derivation when [[t]X]∼ = [[t]Y ]∼. This proof has a straightforward formalization in PA.
(3) By formalization of part 1 it can be proved inPA that the size of the derivation of a sentence [[t]X]∼ ∈ ′ is bound
by t. It also gives a primitive recursive upper bound b(t) for X when [[t]X]∼ ∈ ′ holds. So the considered
predicates can be represented by arithmetical formulas:
“x = F where F ∈ ⋃ or the statement [F ]∼ ∈ ′ has a derivation of the size < x’’,
“x = t and for some X with X < b(x) the statement [[t]X]∼ ∈ ′ has a derivation of the size < x’’.
These are provably 1-formulas by Lemma 8.1. It is provable in PA that the recursive function
h(x) =
⎧⎨⎩ the code of [[t]X]∼ if x = t, X < b(x) and the statement [[t]X]∼ ∈ 
′
has a derivation of the size < x,
0 otherwise
is total and computes the mapping (22). 
Let an inﬁnite substitution  from Lemma 8.1 be ﬁxed. The mapping [F ]∼ → F is a choice function. Let
 = {F | [F ]∼ ∈ ′},  = {F | [F ]∼ ∈ }. The set Sb( ∪ ) consists of ﬁxed points of  only, so
e1 ∼ e2 ⇔ e1 = e2 when e1, e2 ∈ Sb( ∪ ). (23)
Deﬁnition 8.3. Let H = H(x1, . . . , xn) be a pattern formula where (x1, . . . , xn) is the list of all proof and sentence
letters occurring in H. For any t ∈ PTm there exists at most one formula F for which [t]F ∈ . When such a formula
does exist and has the form F = H(e1, . . . , en) deﬁne ((xi .H)t )+ = ei . (Note that in this case the expressions t,
(xi .H)t and ei are ﬁxed points of .) For all other e ∈ Expr set (e)+ = e. Let  = 0 where the mapping 0 is deﬁned
on the image of  (all expressions e with the property e = ) as follows:
e0 =
⎧⎨⎩ f (e10, . . . , ek0) if e = f (e1, . . . , ek), f ∈ ,e if e is the ﬁrst-order variable,
(vt0)
+ if e = vt .
Lemma 8.4. (1) e0 = e for every e ∈ Sb( ∪ ).
(2) If e =  then the value e0 is deﬁned and Sb(e0) ∩ (Dom() ∪ Dom(0)) = ∅, so  = 0 = .
(3)  is a comprehensive idempotent inﬁnite substitution with the elimination property. The mapping e → e,
(e ∈ Expr) is computable.
(4) The statements (1)–(3) are provable in PA.
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Proof. (1) Induction on e. The nontrivial case is e = (xi .H)t . It is sufﬁcient to prove that ((xi .H)t )+ = (xi .H)t when
(xi .H)t ∈ Sb(∪). Suppose the opposite. Then [t]H(e1, . . . , en) ∈  and ((xi .H)t )+ = ei . But the rules (21) cannot
add new references to Sb(
⋃
′) ∪ Sb(⋃), so (xi .H)t ∈ ⋃V and t ∈ ⋃V. This means that the equivalence classes
of formulas [t]H(e¯) and [t]H((x¯.H)t ) appeared in  at some step of saturation and were merged, so ei ∼ (xi .H)t .
Thus, ei = (xi .H)t by (23). Contradiction.
(2) By induction on e one can easily prove that e0 is deﬁned when e = . Suppose for some e holds e =  and
Sb(e0)∩(Dom()∪Dom(0)) = ∅. Consider one with the least e. It will have the form e = vt and e0 = (vt0)+.
Note that t = t (the elimination property of ).
Suppose that e′ = vt0 is a ﬁxed point of (·)+, so e0 = e′. Then Sb(e′)∩Dom() = ∅ by the elimination property
of . If e′ ∈ Sb( ∪ ) then Sb(e′) ∩ Dom(0) = ∅ too by the ﬁrst part of the lemma. If e′ ∈ Sb( ∪ ) then
e′ = vt0 . Indeed, e′ ∼ vt0 and e′ /∈
⋃
V. By Lemma 8.1, e′ = vt ′ where t ′ ∼ t0. Then t ′ = t ′ = t0 = t0 by the
elimination property of  and inductive hypothesis. Thus, Sb(e′) = {vt0} ∪ Sb(t0). But by the inductive hypothesis,
vt00 = (vt20)
+ = (vt0)+ = vt0 and Sb(t0) ∩ Dom(0) = ∅, so Sb(e′) ∩ Dom(0) = ∅ too.
Now suppose that (e′)+ = e′′ = e′. It implies Sb(e′′) ⊂ Sb( ∪ ). This is impossible because every member of
Sb( ∪ ) is a ﬁxed point of  and a ﬁxed point of 0 (see part 1). Contradiction.
(3) The substitution  is idempotent and 0 is deﬁned on every ﬁxed point of , so e = e0 is deﬁned for every
e ∈ Expr. By the deﬁnition,  is a computable inﬁnite substitution and Dom() ⊂ Dom() ∪Dom(0). By the part 2
of the lemma, Sb(e) ∩ Dom() = ∅. This proves the idempotency and the elimination property of .
Let us prove the comprehension property. Suppose that t = s and v is a second-order variable identiﬁer. Case
vt = vt and vs = vs. Then vt = vt0 = (vt0)+ = (vs0)+ = vs0 = vs. Case vt = vt or vs = vs.
Suppose vt = vt. By Lemma 8.1 vt ∈ ⋃V. So t, vt ∈ Sb( ∪ ) and t = t0 = t, vt = vt0 = vt.
If vs = vs too then s = s, so t = s, vt = vs and vt = vs. Suppose vs = vs. Then vs = (vs0)+ =
(vt)
+ = (vt)+ = (vt)+ = vt = vt because (e)+ = e for e ∈ Sb( ∪ ).
(4) The straightforward formalization of the proofs above. 
9. Symbolic countermodel
Now we are ready to show that the saturation procedure provides the complete decision algorithm for FLPext. Given
,we deﬁne a special (,)-validity relation (,) for which (,)F holdswhenFLPext F , but (,)  F0.
This proves the converse to the statement of Lemma 7.4, soFLPext F0 iff every computation of the saturation procedure
with the initial formula F0 terminates with failure.
Deﬁnition 9.1. Let F ∈ Fm. If F has the form G → H then deﬁne
(,)F ⇔ ((,) / G or (,)H), (24)
for all other formulas set
(,)F ⇔ F ∈ . (25)
Lemma 9.2. For every F,G ∈ Fm hold:
• (,)F iff (,)F;
• (,)F → G iff ((,) / F or (,)G); (,) /⊥;
• if F ∈  then (,)F ; if F ∈  then (,) / F .
Proof. The ﬁrst two statements follow immediately from Deﬁnition 9.1. Let us prove the last one. Induction on the
construction of the formula F. Note that e = e = e for every e ∈ Sb( ∪ ) (Lemma 8.4). Cases when F is a proof
or sentence letter or a reference or has the form [t]G are covered by (25) because  ∩  = ∅ by Lemma 8.2, part 2.
Let F = G → H ∈  ∪ . But  ⊂ ⋃′,  ⊂ ⋃ and [F ]∼ /∈ ′\ (Lemma 8.2, part 1), so [F ]∼ ∈  ∪ .
Then the equivalence classes of formulas F,G,H appear in V at some stages of saturation. Suppose that F ∈ . Then
[F ]∼ ∈  and one of the conditions [G]∼ ∈  or [H ]∼ ∈  is forced by Step 1 of the saturation procedure. But G and
H are ﬁxed points of , so one of the conditions G ∈  or H ∈  holds too. By the inductive hypothesis, (,)  G
or (,)H . So (,)G → H . Case F ∈  is similar to the previous one. 
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Lemma 9.3. If F1, . . . , Fn  FLPextF and (,)Fi , i = 1, . . . , n, then (,)F .
Proof. By Lemma 9.2, part 2, the set of all (,)-valid formulas contains all tautologies and is closed under modus
ponens rule. It remains to prove that the axioms (A1)–(A5) are (,)-valid. By Lemma 9.2, part 1, it is sufﬁcient
to consider the axioms which are ﬁxed points of . Let an axiom A of the form (A1)–(A5) be a ﬁxed point of . All
members of Sb(A) are ﬁxed points of ,  and 0 (Lemma 8.4).
Case A = [t]F → F . Suppose that (,) [t]F . Then [t]F ∈  and [[t]F ]∼ ∈ ′. Consider the derivation of
the statement [[t]F ]∼ ∈ ′ by the rules (21) from the axioms of the form [H ]∼ ∈ ′ where [H ]∼ ∈ . By simple
induction on the derivation which involves Lemma 9.2 we prove that (,)F .
Cases (A2) and (A3) follow from Lemma 9.2.
Case A = [t1]F1 ∧ · · · ∧ [tn]Fn → (G ↔ H) where G = H mod S and S is the conditional uniﬁcation problem
(15). Suppose that all the formulas [ti]Fi are (,)-valid. Then [ti]Fi ∈ . By (23) and Lemma 8.2, part 2, the
conditional uniﬁcation problem (15) has a trivial solution: the ordinary equality of expressions is consistent with (15).
Thus, G = H mod S implies that G coincides with H. Then (G ↔ H) is a tautology, so it is (,)-valid.
Case (A5). Let A = [t]F(e¯) → [t]F( (x¯.F )t ) be the axiom (A5) and (,) [t]F(e¯), so [t]F(e¯) ∈ . Then
(x¯.F )t = (x¯.F )t = ((x¯.F )t0)+ = ((x¯.F )t )+ = e¯ because t, (x¯.F )t ∈ Sb(A) are ﬁxed points of ,  and 0. Thus,
(,) [t]F( (x¯.F )t ). 
Theorem 9.4. The logic FLPext is decidable: FLPext F0 iff every computation of the saturation procedure with the
initial formula F0 terminates with failure.
Proof. Suppose every computation of the saturation procedure with the initial formulaF0 terminates with failure. Then
FLPext F0 by Lemma 7.4. Suppose there exists a successive computation of the saturation procedure starting with F0.
Let (,) be the corresponding validity relation. Then F0 ∈ , so (,)  F0 by Lemma 9.2. Thus, FLPext  F0
by Lemma 9.3. The set of all computations with the initial formula F0 is ﬁnite (Theorem 7.1) and can be constructed
effectively given F0. So this derivability test can be performed by an algorithm. 
10. Arithmetical countermodel
In this section we construct an arithmetical interpretation ∗ =〈Prf, c,m, (·)∗〉 (see Deﬁnition 4.6) such that
(,)F ⇔ (F ∗ is valid arithmetical formula) ⇔ PA F ∗ (26)
holds for every formula F ∈ Fm. The arithmetical completeness of FLPext will be proved as the direct consequence
of this fact.
Note that the image of  coincides with the set Expr1 = {e ∈ Expr | e = e}. Let PTm1 = PTm ∩ Expr1,
Fm1 = Fm ∩ Expr1. For the ﬁrst-order variables from Expr1 set p∗j = pj , pj ∈ PTm1,
S∗i =
{
Si+ 1 = Si+ 1 if Si ∈ ,
Si+ 1 = 0 if Si ∈ Fm1\.
For a reference vt ∈ Expr1 deﬁne the value (v)∗(n) for n = t:
(v)∗(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
vt+ 1 = vt+ 1 if vt ∈ ,
vt+ 1 = 0 if vt ∈ Fm1\,
vt if vt ∈ PTm1.
(27)
Extend these partial defaults as in Deﬁnition 4.6 where the arithmetical formula Prf (x, y) and the recursive terms
c(x) = z.C(x, z), m(x, y) = z.M(x, y, z) are the solutions of the following multiple arithmetical ﬁxed point
equation (FPE) which involves the standard Gödel proof predicate PROOF(x, y) and the operation ⊗ = mPROOF
from Section 4:
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Prf (x, y) ⇔PA PROOF (x, y) ∨ (“x = t for some t ∈ PTm1" ∧ “y = B∗ for some B and [t]B ∈ ’’);
M(x, y, z) ⇔PA “if x = s, y = t for some s, t ∈ PTm1 then z = st, if x = s for some s ∈ PTm1 and
y = t for any t ∈ PTm1 then z = (w.PROOF(w, B∗)) ⊗ y where [s]B ∈  (such B is
unique if exists) and z = 0 ⊗ y otherwise,
if x = s for any s ∈ PTm1 and y = t for some t ∈ PTm1 then z = x ⊗
(w.PROOF(w, B∗)) where [s]B ∈  (such B is unique if exists) and z = x ⊗ 0 other-
wise,
z = x ⊗ y otherwise’’;
C(x, z) ⇔PA “x = f  for some closed provably total recursive term f and if value(f ) = t for some
t ∈ PTm1 then z = !t
else if PROOF (value(f ), ) for some formula  then z = l.PROOF (l, Prf (f, ))
else z = value(f )’’.
Comment. Here  ⇔PA  stands for PA  ↔ . The right-hand parts of the FPE are 
1-formulas. By the
arithmetical ﬁxed point argument the arithmetical formulas Prf (x, y), C(x, z), M(x, y, z) satisfying the FPE do
exist. But unlike the case of Deﬁnition 4.6 the defaults are partial (p∗i , S∗j and v∗(n) remain undeﬁned for some i, j, v
and n) and the extended translation (·)∗ is a partial recursive function. This implies that Prf, C and M are 
1-formulas
(so c and m are recursive terms) but is insufﬁcient to prove that Prf is provably 1. Our plan is as follows. It will be
shown that the value e∗ is deﬁned for all e ∈ Expr1 (this fact is provable in PA). As consequences, we establish that
Prf is a provably 1-formula, the triple 〈Prf, c,m〉 is a basic interpretation and (26) holds when F ∈ Fm1. Then we
extend the partial defaults to the total ones and prove (26) for every F ∈ Fm.
Lemma 10.1. (1) For every t ∈ PTm1 the translation t∗ is deﬁned, it is a closed provably total recursive term and its
value is t, i.e. PA  t∗ = t.
(2) For every formula F ∈ Fm1 the translation F ∗ is deﬁned and if F ∗ = G∗ where G ∈ Fm1 then F = G.
Proof. If e ∈ Expr1 then Sb(e) ⊂ Expr1 by the elimination property of , so both statements can be proved by
induction on the deﬁnition of expressions t and F. 
Corollary 10.2. (1) Prf (x, y) is a provably 1-formula.
(2) For every formula F ∈ Fm1 the translation F ∗ is a closed arithmetical provably 1-formula, so F ∗ is valid iff
PA F ∗.
(3) The condition (26) holds for every formula F ∈ Fm1.
Proof. (1) Consider the right-hand part of the deﬁnition of Prf from FPE. The formula PROOF(x, y) is provably
1. The formula “x = t for some t ∈ PTm1’’ is provably 1 by Lemma 8.4. The condition “[t]B ∈ ’’ can be
represented by a provably 1-formula by Lemmas 8.2 and 8.1. By the formalization of Lemma 10.1 it can be proved in
PA that B∗ can be computed from B by a recursive function g and the value g(B) is deﬁned for everyB ∈ Expr1.
Moreover, B < k · B∗ holds for a suitable constant k. So the quantiﬁcation over B in “y = B∗ for some B and
[t]B ∈ ’’ is bounded and it is a 1-formula too. Thus, Prf (x, y) is equivalent in PA to a provably 1-formula. (2)
Follows from (1) Now (3) can be proved by induction on the deﬁnition of F. 
Lemma 10.3. 〈Prf, c,m〉 is a basic interpretation.
Proof. Prf is a single-valued proof predicate. Indeed, it is provably 1 by Corollary 10.2. The conditions 2 and 3
from Deﬁnition 4.1 are forced by FPE (see Lemma 8.2). Let us prove the remaining condition (1) If PA  then
PA PROOF(n¯, ) for some n ∈  and PA Prf (n¯, ) by FPE. Now suppose that PA can prove Prf (n¯, ).
It is a closed1-formula, so it is valid. ByFPE there are two possibilities: eitherPROOF(n¯, ) is valid, which implies
PA  because PROOF is a proof predicate, or n = t,  = B∗ and [t]B ∈ . In the latter case (,) [t]B, which
implies (,)B by Lemma 9.3. But B ∈ Fm1, so PA B∗ by Corollary 10.2.
It remains to prove that the recursive terms c and m deﬁned by FPE satisfy the conditions (5). All the formulas from
(5) are provably equivalent to closed 
1-formulas. PA is 
1-complete, so it is sufﬁcient to prove that these formulas are
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valid. Let f, g be closed provably total recursive terms and , be arithmetical formulas. The validity of the formulas
∃z (m(f, g) = z), ∃z (c(f ) = z) follows immediately from FPE and corresponding properties of ⊗.
Consider the formula Prf (f, ) → Prf (c(f ), Prf (f, )). Suppose that Prf (f, ) is valid. Then
PA Prf (f, ) and Prf (z, Prf (f, )) is valid for z = l.PROOF (l, Prf (f, )). The value of f  is
f . If value(f ) = t for every t ∈ PTm1 then c(f ) = z and Prf (c(f ), Prf (f, )) is valid too. If
value(f ) = t for some t ∈ Tm1 then  = B∗ where [t]B ∈  and the formula Prf (c(f ), Prf (f, ))
coincides with ([!t][t]B)∗. Its validity follows from 9.1, 9.3 and 10.2.
The speciﬁcation of m can be proved in a similar way. 
Now we extend the partial defaults to the total ones. Note that the expressions of the form e are ﬁxed points of  so
the translations (e)∗ are already deﬁned. For a proof or sentence letter x /∈ Expr1 let x∗ = (x)∗. For a second-order
variable identiﬁer v extent the partial recursive function v∗(n) to the total one as follows.
Case n = t for some t ∈ PTm.
(v)∗(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vt+ 1 = vt+ 1 if vt ∈ ,
vt+ 1 = 0¯ if vt ∈ Fm1\,
vt if vt ∈ PTm1,
(vt)∗ if vt ∈ Expr\Expr1.
Case n = t for every t ∈ PTm. For these n deﬁne v∗(n) in the standard way as in Lemma 4.5. (These values are
never used by the translation (·)∗; we deﬁne them by the formal reason only.)
Lemma 10.4. e∗ = (e)∗ for every e ∈ Expr.
Proof. Induction on the deﬁnition of e ∈ Expr. For e ∈ Expr1 the statement is valid because e = e. Cases when
e /∈ Expr1 is a proof or sentence letter or has one of the forms !t , ts,F → G, [t]F follow immediately from the deﬁnition
of the extension and inductive hypothesis. Consider the remaining case e = vt /∈ Expr1. By 10.1 and the inductive
hypothesis, (vt )∗ = v∗(value(t∗)) = v∗(value((t)∗)) = v∗(t). Note that vt = vt because  is idempotent
and comprehensive. If vt ∈ Expr1 then v∗(t) = (vt)∗ = (vt)∗. If vt ∈ Expr1 then (vt)∗ = (vt)∗ = v∗(t).
Thus, in both subcases (vt )∗ = (vt)∗. 
The following lemma shows that the (extended) total recursive function v∗(n) is a valid default in the sense
of Section 4.
Lemma 10.5. Let  be an arithmetical formula which matches a pattern F ∈ Pat with a well formed resulting
substitution . If Prf (n, ) is valid then (Si .F )∗(n) = Si when Si occurs in F and (pj .F )∗(n) = z.(pj) when
pj occurs in F.
Proof. For the case n = t for every t ∈ PTm the statement was proved in Lemma 4.5. Suppose n = t for
some t ∈ PTm and Prf (n, ) is valid. Then  = B∗ where [t]B ∈  and B = F0 for some substitution 0, so
Si = (Si0)∗, z.(pj) = (pj0)∗ hold for proof and sentence letters occurring in F. Let x¯ = (x1, . . . , xn) be the
list of all proof and sentence letters from F, i.e. F = F(x¯), and e¯ = (e1, . . . , en) where ei = xi0. Then B = F(e¯).
We claim that (xi .F )t = ei . Indeed, t = t = t0 = t by Lemma 8.4 and  = 0. Suppose (xi .F )t is a ﬁxed
point of . Then (xi .F )t = ((xi .F )t0)+ = ((xi .F )t )+ = ei . Now suppose that (xi .F )t = (xi .F )t . By Lemma
8.2 (part 4), (xi .F )t ∈ ⋃V, so the formula [t]F((x¯.F )t ) appears in the equivalence class [[t]B]∼ ∈  at some step
of the saturation procedure. Then F((x¯.F )t ) ∼ F(e¯), so (xi .F )t = ei = ei . By Lemma 8.4, ei0 = ei because
ei ∈ Sb(). So (xi .F )t = ei in this case too.
By the deﬁnition of (·)∗ and Lemma 10.4, (xi .F )∗(t) = ((xi .F )t )∗ = ((xi .F )t)∗ = e∗i = (xi0)∗. 
Theorem 10.6. ∗ = 〈Prf, c,m, (·)∗〉 is an interpretation. It satisﬁes the condition (26).
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Proof. By Lemmas 10.3 and 10.5 ∗ is an interpretation. By Lemmas 10.2, 10.4 and 9.2 the condition (26) holds for
every F ∈ Fm. 
Theorem 10.7 (Arithmetical completeness). For every formula F ∈ Fm the following conditions are equivalent:
1. FLPref F ;
2. PA F ∗ for every interpretation ∗;
3. F ∗ is valid for every interpretation ∗.
Proof. The implication (1) ⇒ (2) was proved in Theorem 6.2. The implication (2) ⇒ (3) is a trivial consequence
of the soundness of PA. In order to prove 3.⇒1. we apply the criterion from Theorem 9.4. Suppose FLPrefF . Then
there exists a successive computation of the saturation procedure starting with F. Let (,) be the corresponding
validity relation and ∗ be the interpretation from Theorem 10.6. Then F ∈ , so (,)  F by Lemma 9.2 and F ∗
is not valid by (26). 
11. Inference rules speciﬁcation and testing
We consider the FLP-language as a scheme language for arithmetic. A ﬁgure  of the form F1, . . . , Fn/F is a
scheme for the set of ﬁgures
ˆ =
{
F ∗1 , . . . , F ∗n
F ∗
∣∣∣∣ ∗ is an interpretation} .
It represents an inference rule for the language L(PA). We have seen that the property of a formula to be a schema of
valid (or PA-provable) arithmetical formulas is decidable (Theorems 10.7, 9.4). The similar result holds for schemes
of inference rules: the property of schemes to be PA-admissible is decidable.
Theorem 11.1 (Admissibility test). A scheme  = F1, . . . , Fn/F represents a PA-admissible inference rule iff
FLPref F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn → F .
Proof. FLPref F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn → F implies PA F ∗1 ∧ · · · ∧ F ∗n → F ∗ for every interpretation ∗ so PA F ∗ when
PA F ∗i . Let FLPref  F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn → F . By Theorem 10.7 there exists an interpretation ∗ for which the formula
F ∗1 ∧ · · · ∧ F ∗n → F ∗ is not valid. This interpretation has an additional property (Corollary 10.2, Lemma 10.4): it
translates formulas into closed provably 1 -formulas. So PA F ∗1 , . . . ,PA F ∗n and PAF ∗ which means that  is
not PA-admissible. 
Examples. The following ﬁgures are PA-admissible schemes in the FLP-language (for convenience we use the aliases
fromSection 2). It can be establishedwith the help ofTheorem11.1 by the straightforward construction of corresponding
FLPref -derivations or by the decision procedure for FLPref .
[p0]S0
S0
















Comment. Note that an FLPref -derivation which veriﬁes an arithmetical rule by Theorem 11.1 is a valid certiﬁcate
of admissibility which can be stored, send to another party and tested. It is shown in [17] how the certiﬁcates of this
kind (i.e. the proof logic derivations) can be used for the automated elimination of admissible rules in order to restore
the ground PA-derivation. The method can be easily adopted for the case of FLPref . Consider the possibility to store
the admissible inference rules in some database shared between several automated reasoning systems which can query
about the existing rules and add new ones. When only a scheme of a rule is stored the reliability of a system may
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be affected by other systems which may add an incorrect rule to the database. The more secure way is to store the
admissibility certiﬁcate together with a rule so the system can test the validity of the reply itself. The FLPref -based
speciﬁcation method and admissibility test produce the admissible rules which are already supplied with the required
certiﬁcates.
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